Corporate governance and corruption: A cross-country analysis by Wu, X.
Wu, X., 2005. Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis. Governance: 
An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 18 (2), 151-170. 
 
                                                
Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis 
 
Xun Wu1
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy 
National University of Singapore 
 
Abstract 
While the empirical literature on the causes of corruption has focused primarily on the 
demand side of corruption, that is, the corrupt officials who receive bribe payments, the 
role of the private sector as the supply side of corruption has not been examined 
thoroughly in this literature. In this paper, we argue that corporate governance is among 
the important factors determining the level of corruption. Using a cross-country dataset, 
we test hypotheses that explicitly link various measures of corporate governance to the 
level of corruption. Our results show that corporate governance standards can have 
profound impacts on the effectiveness of the global anti-corruption campaign.  
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Corporate governance has emerged as a major policy concern for many 
developing countries following the financial crisis in Asia, Russia and Latin America. 
The collapse of Enron suggests that even the highly industrialized countries such as the 
U.S. are not immune from the disastrous effects of bad corporate governance. Studies 
have shown that low corporate governance standards raise cost of capital, lower 
operating performance of industry, and impede the flow of investment (Daily and 
Dalton; Agrawal and Knoeber; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love). Following corporate 
scandals of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, more and more countries have embarked on 
corporate governance reforms to strengthen the protection of the interests of investors. 
Policy-makers around the world have another important reason to be concerned 
with corporate governance: poor corporate governance also breeds corruption. 
Corruption, defined here as the misuse of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 
1978), has both the demand and supply sides to it. While much attention of the global 
anti-corruption campaign has been directed towards the demand side of corruption 
(Vogl), that is, the corrupt government officials, the supply side of corruption is just as 
important, and the role of the corporations as the main contributors of bribe payment 
should not be underestimated. Rules of corporate governance, such as accountability, 
transparency and fairness, have profound impacts on the motives and constraints for 
both the bribe takers and bribe payers involved in corrupt practices.  
The linkage between corporate governance and corruption is especially relevant 
in the context of developing countries. For instance, many developing countries have 
embarked on various forms of market-oriented reforms to modernize their economies, 
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and the privatization of state-owned enterprises has often been a centerpiece of such 
reforms. Privatization, however, presents special challenges for both the public sector 
governance and corporate governance in developing countries. In some transition 
economies, weak corporate governance has facilitated the corrupt officials in looting the 
already impoverished states during the process of privatization (Black, Kraakman and 
Tarassova).  
Globalization also poses both the opportunities and challenges to corporate 
governance reforms in developing countries. On the one hand, globalization can 
accelerate the convergence of corporate governance to international standards (Khanna, 
Kogan and Palepu); on the other hand, however, globalization can increase the 
competition for a large number of inefficient domestic firms and thus may create high 
pressure for them to bribe in order to survive. In addition, the role of multinational 
companies in the battle against corruption should not be overlooked. While they 
certainly are capable of making significant impacts in improving the global business 
environment, some recent high profile corporate bribery scandals involving 
multinational companies (for example, Xerox in India, IBM in Argentina and Siemens in 
Singapore) indicate that bribery may have been used by some multinationals as a 
marketing strategy to penetrate into emerging markets. Transparency International’s  
Bribe Payers Index shows that companies from some of the leading exporting nations in 
the world are among the most likely to pay bribes in foreign countries to gain unfair 
advantages over their competitors (Transparency International). As a result, in an era of 
globalization bad corporate governance may facilitate the exporting of bribery practices 
cross the borders, and thus may undermine the effectiveness of the global anti-
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corruption campaign.  
A better understanding of the linkage between corporate governance and 
corruption is of paramount importance to a more balanced approach to corruption. 
While empirical studies on the causes of corruption have significantly advanced our 
understanding on the demand side of corruption, that is, on the motives and constraints 
facing public officials in corrupt practices, critical questions regarding the supply side of 
corruption remain unanswered.  
This paper complements the existing empirical literature on corruption by 
explicitly exploring the linkage between corporate governance and corruption in a cross-
country context. The paper proceeds as follows: the next section focuses on theories that 
link various aspects of corporate governance to corruption and presents several testable 
hypotheses. Section Three describes the data and presents empirical evidences based on 
a cross-country analysis. In the last section we conclude. 
 
Corporate Governance and Corruption: Theories and Hypotheses 
Corporate governance specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs (OECD). To understand how corporate governance would 
affect the level of corruption, we need to first study how various participants of the 
firms would be affected by bribery practices and why bribery practices have been 
pervasive in business. In this section, we focus on three questions: 1) Are bribery 
practices rational from the firms’ perspective? 2) Why are bribery practices so pervasive 
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if bribery is counterproductive for firms? 3) How would good corporate governance 
help to reduce the level of corruption?  
 
The Hidden Costs of Bribery 
Bribery can take place in a wide spectrum of business activities over which some 
government officials hold discretionary powers. For example, firms may bribe public 
officials to avoid or reduce tax, to secure public procurement contracts, to bypass laws 
and regulations, or to block the entry of potential competitors. At the surface bribery 
seems to be cost-effective for the firms because bribe payment is often a fraction of the 
monetary value of the services rendered by the corrupt officials. The reason to bribe 
becomes even more compelling when public officials hold the power to punish the firms 
for not paying the bribe (revoking the business license, for example). 
The seemingly justifiable bribery practices (for economic gains or for survival) 
have several hidden costs for the owners or the shareholders of the firms that might be 
overlooked, or at least underestimated. First of all, bribery exposes the firms to 
substantial legal and financial risks in the future. Firms involved in bribery will bear the 
risks of legal actions against them if the bribery acts are caught. Corporate managers 
who are convicted of bribery are often prosecuted under criminal laws and face not only 
fine but also jail sentence. There are substantial financial risks involved as well. 
Government may decide to nullify contracts that have been initiated or influenced by 
bribery, or to blacklist the firms for future government projects. In 1996, five 
multinational companies (Siemens, Pirelle, BICC, Marubeni and Tomen) were banned 
by the Government of Singapore for bidding on any government projects for five year 
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after their consultant was convicted of paying bribes for utilities construction contracts. 
For an established firm, its reputation amounts to a significant component of its overall 
market value and bribery practices expose the firms to the risk of losing such value. In a 
recent empirical study on corruption and international corporate value, Charles Lee and 
David Ng find that level of corruption has negative impacts on shareholder value of the 
firms.  
Second, firms opening their doors for corruption may find it difficult to resist 
demands for bribery payments in the future (Rose-Acekerman, 1999). Firms with a 
reputation of bribing their way out are more likely to be demanded for higher bribe 
payment by the corrupt officials, sometimes for services that are normally free of bribery 
for other firms. Bribe payment from firms with such a reputation may be perceived to be 
“safe” from the perspective of the potential corrupt officials and they (the corrupt 
officials) may increase the level of bureaucratic interferences in order to secure bribe 
payments from these firms. As a result, firms that hope to circumvent government 
regulations may actually face an increased level of bureaucratic interferences.  Using 
firm level data, Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-Jin Wei find that firms pay more bribes 
face higher, not lower, effective red tap because corrupt officials can often customize the 
nature and amount of harassment on firms in order to maximize bribe collection. 
Perhaps the most damaging consequence of bribery for the firms is that it 
undermines the firms’ drive in developing long-term competitive advantages. If 
managers realize that they can win business through bribery rather than through 
providing better products or services, they would be busy courting governmental 
officials rather than concentrating on developing the competitiveness of the firms 
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through innovation and better investment decisions. In 1977, when the U.S. government 
first enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to prevent the U.S. firms from 
bribing foreign public officials, the critic questioned that such a unilateral move by the 
U.S. government would put U.S. companies in a competitiveness disadvantage in many 
emerging markets. Today, multinational companies based in the U.S. have been 
recognized as global leaders in many fields they operate. In retrospect, tough on bribery 
might have forced the U.S. companies to focus their attention on developing long-term 
competitive advantages through innovation and better investment decisions.   
In summary, bribery practices have several hidden costs for the firms that may 
dwarf any immediate gains from such practices, and therefore, firms should avoid or 
minimize the opportunities of bribery practices in order to protect the interests of the 
owners or shareholders.  
 
The Principal-Agent Problem and Bribery 
A distinction should be made between passive and active bribe before we 
proceed further. Passive bribe occurs when the firms feel that they have to pay to avoid 
being punished, and active bribe occurs when firms initiate the transaction of bribe 
payment in order to evade their responsibilities to the public or to undermine the efforts 
of their competitors. Such distinction is crucial because in the former case it is difficult 
for the firms to “opt out” of the corrupt practices, while in the latter case firms have 
many options available. Here we turn our attention to the latter cases.   
The principal-agent problem or agency problem in modern corporate system may 
account for the fact that many firms do get involved in corrupt practices despite the 
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costs of bribery may outweigh the benefits. The principal-agent problem arises when 
there is a separation between those who own the firm—the principals—and those who 
control it—the agents, and the interests of the principals may not coincide with those of 
the agents. For example, while the owners (the principals) are more interested in 
maximizing the return for their investments in the long run, the managers (the agents) 
might be motivated by their own personal interests. The incentive structure for the 
managers differs from that of owners, and so does their time horizon and risk attitudes. 
Bribery may offer the managers the opportunities of cashing in on any immediate 
upside movement from bribery activities while leaving the future potential risks and 
costs to the owners or shareholders. For example, securing a public project by bribing 
public officials may increase the value of the cooperation for the short-run, and thus 
significantly increase the compensations for the mangers, but the firms may be held 
criminally liable for the bribery involvement for the years to come and the shareholders 
are forced to bear such a risk. The abilities to win business through bribery may also 
allow non-performing managers to temporarily conceal their failure in increasing the 
value of the firms through strategic planning and hardworking, and bribery may 
actually enable the managers to shirk without facing the consequences of such behaviors.  
Another dimension of the principal-agent problem arises from the divergence of 
interests and objectives between the inside shareholders and outside shareholders. 
Because of their differences in the control of top management, the access to the firm’s 
financial information and the portfolio of holdings, inside shareholders and outside 
shareholders can be affected differently by bribery practices. For example, the inside 
shareholders, through their control of the management, can shift the burden of bribe 
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payments completely to the outside shareholders. The information advantage of the 
inside shareholders over the outside shareholders allows them to pull out quickly 
should anything go wrong.  Inside shareholders may also have controlling stakes in 
multiple firms, enabling them to redistribute the costs and benefits of bribery practices 
among a set of different firms—a strategy that can be detrimental to the outside 
shareholders in these firms. A derivative suit filed by the minority shareholders of South 
Korea’s Samsung Corporation in 2001 against the chairman and directors (mostly inside 
shareholders) of the company for bribery provides an excellent example of the clash 
between the inside shareholders and outside shareholders over the bribery practices.  
Furthermore, the challenges in monitoring and controlling today’s many large 
corporations also add multiple layers to the principal-agent problem. Many bribery 
cases involve low level mangers and employees instead of the top management. Even if 
the top management may be committed to ethical business conduct, middle or low level 
managers may have strong incentive to boost their performance and pay through 
bribery, and as a result, the decisions to bribe could be made by managers at various 
levels without the knowledge of the top management. For example, many multinational 
companies have established wholly owned subsidiary companies in many regions or 
countries they operate, and some of these subsidiaries have become big spenders in the 
market for corrupt services.  
Last, information asymmetry between the principals and the agents regarding 
bribery makes it more difficult for the owners or the shareholders to solve the principal-
agent problem of bribery through monitoring. The agents have the tendency to hide any 
information that they think reflects poorly on them, may it be safety violation or 
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involvement in bribery practices. The fact that bribery is illegal and often kept in secret 
allows the managers (the agents) to collude with corrupt officials in deceiving the firms’ 
owners as well as the public.   
 
The Coordination Game and Bribery 
The principal-agent model of bribery may have limited applicability in 
explaining the widespread bribery practices arising from two circumstances. The first is 
that, while we have focused our attention on the active bribe so far, many bribery 
practices are initiated by managers who try to avoid punishment of not paying the 
bribes. For example, in a society with high level of corruption, the fear of being undercut 
by its competitors with bribe payment forces all firms to do the same in order to survive.  
Under the second circumstance, the level of corruption is found very high in countries 
where most firms are family-owned businesses that do not encounter principal-agent 
problems. For example, Haider Khan questions the merit of applying the principal-agent 
model of corporate governance to Asia where the majority of the businesses are family-
owned.  
We can use a simple coordination game as follows to illustrate firms’ choices in 
those situations. We assume two firms compete for a public contract, and the payoff 
matrix is shown in the table below. The number in the top-left corner in each cell 
represents the payoff for Firm A and the number in the bottom-right corner in each cell 
represents the payoff for Firm B. We assume that the firm involved in bribery can gain 
an unfair advantage over the other firm if the other doesn’t bribe, but such gain would 
be offset by potential costs discussed in the last section. The firm choosing not to bribe 
given the other firm bribes will suffer big losses as indicated by the change from 4 to 0. 
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When both firms offer bribe (4th Scenario), no firm can gain an unfair advantage over the 
other, and the award of the public contract would be determined by the same 
probability distribution prior to the bribery; but the corrupt officials can charge higher 
premium for their services because demand for them are higher.  This game has two 
equilibriums: (not bribe, not bribe) and (bribe, bribe). While the best strategy for each 
firm given the other firm doesn’t bribe is not to bribe, the best strategy in the situation 
that other firm bribes is to bribe in order to avoid the worst scenario (2nd Scenario for 
Firm A and 3rd Scenario for Firm B).  
 
Firm B 




2nd Scenario Not bribe 
 4 3 
Firm A 3 
3rd Scenario 
1 




The implications of the simple coordination game are straightforward. A firm’s 
decision to pay bribe has negative effects on other firms in the game by decreasing their 
rate of success with a given bribe payment or raising the bribe amount needed for 
success, or both. While the individual firm’s best choice is to bribe given others would 
do the same, this best strategy from the perspective of the individual firm leads to the 
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worst scenario collectively for all firms involved. On the other hand, the simple 
coordination game shows that the equilibrium at which no firm bribes is also a stable 
outcome: once everyone stops to bribe there is no incentive to defect from this 
equilibrium (Rose-Acekerman, 2002). 
The simple model of coordination game helps to explain why bribery practices 
are more widespread and persistent in some industries than in others. Transnational 
International’s Bribe Payers Index 2002 reports a high occurrence of bribery practices in 
industries such as public work, arms and defense, and oil and gas. Bribery will be a 
dominant strategy for firms in a specific industry once it becomes an industry norm.  It 
also explains why a country with high level of corruption may find it extremely difficult 
to move away from the equilibrium at which many firms are engaged in bribery 
practices in one form or another.  
 
Corporate Governance and Corruption: Hypotheses 
Good corporate governance can lead to the reduction of corruption by 
addressing both the principle-agent problem and the problem of the coordination game. 
The principles of good corporate governance such as accountability and transparency 
not only can improve firms’ operating performance, but also can reduce the level of 
corruption by imposing more constraints facing both the corrupt officials and the 
corruptors from the private sector. In order to verify our claims empirically, we propose 
the following two hypotheses to explore the linkage between corporate governance and 
corruption.  
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Hypothesis 1: Corruption will be lower in countries where the corporate boards are more 
accountable to the shareholders 
 
The accountability of the corporate boards to the shareholders, particularly 
outside shareholders, reduces the incidence of bribery. First of all, an independent and 
competent corporate board that truly represents the interest of shareholders can help to 
prevent the opportunistic behaviors of the managers (and/or inside shareholders). 
While the managers (and/or inside shareholders) of the firms might be tempted by the 
immediate gains from bribery, it is in the interest of the shareholders of firms not to be 
involved in bribery activities.  
In addition, having strong corporate boards also makes it more credible for the 
managers to commit to a “no bribe” policy when dealing with public officials who 
demand bribe payment. George Clarke and Lixin Colin Xu find that the level of bribe 
payment depends on the ability of the firms to pay instead of on the potential gains from 
the services provided by the corrupt officials. An independent and competent corporate 
board limits the firm’s ability to pay bribe and can actually boost the bargaining power 
of the managers in dealing with corrupt officials.  
Furthermore, having a strong corporate board helps to deter the extortion 
demands from corrupt officials by increasing the risks they face because there will be 
more people in the know and the chance of whistle blowing from insiders will be 
increased.  
Increasing the accountability of the corporate boards to shareholders can also 
help to solve the problem of the coordination game by providing firms a mechanism to 
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signal to their competitors that they are unwilling to cope with demand from corrupt 
officials for bribe payment, and thus the best strategy for all firms is not to offer bribe.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Corruption will be lower in countries that have higher standards for 
accounting information reporting 
 
The transparency in the provision of accounting information can help to reduce 
the level of corruption by increasing the probability of detecting bribery acts. First of all, 
better accounting practices helps to reduce the information asymmetry between the 
principals and the agents and enable the principals to monitoring the behaviors of the 
agents more effectively. With higher accounting standards, corporate managers who are 
engaged in bribery practices against the will of the shareholders often face a more 
difficult task of hiding the bribe payments. In addition, strengthening the rules and 
regulations regarding accounting information reporting and disclosure helps to fortify 
the internal control and monitoring system within the firms. In 2001, IBM, the American 
computer giant, brought forward to the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
against its wholly-owned subsidiary (IBM Argentina) in a bribery case which involved a 
bribe payment of $4.5 million to public officials of Banco de la Nacion Argentina. It’ll be 
much difficult to uncover the corrupt practices committed by insiders if the company’s 
accounting practice is of low standard. Furthermore, transparency in accounting 
information reporting and disclosure also deters corrupt practices from the demand side 
because it increases the probability of the corrupt practices being caught.   
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Last, high accounting standards help to solve the information asymmetric 
problem in the coordination game discussed earlier. Since bribery practices are often 
kept in secret, the corrupt officials hold information advantage over the firms regarding 
the existence and amount of bribery payments. Better accounting information may 
provide firms better access to information about the activities of other firms in this 
regard and help them to move together to the equilibrium of no bribery.  
 
Corporate Governance and Corruption: Evidence 
 
Data Description 
The lack of empirical studies on the linkage between corporate governance and 
corruption is in part due to the paucity of data on corporate governance. In recent years, 
however, a few attempts have been made by several international consulting firms to 
measure the corporate governance at the country level. For example, in 2001 
PricewaterhouseCooper published its Opacity Index for 35 countries, in which corporate 
governance is one of five components in determining the opacity level of a country. In 
May 2002, McKinsey & Company has ranked 21 economies around the world based on 
perceived quality of corporate governance from a survey of institutional investors. Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), an investment consulting firm based in Hong Kong, has 
also published its own corporate governance rating of 25 emerging markets based on a 
comprehensive analysis of 495 companies in these economies.  Table 1 shows the 
coverage and ratings of these different corporate governance indices.  
These newly available corporate governance ratings serve as timely addition to 
the tools available to the investors, but they are not suitable for our empirical analysis 
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here for three reasons. First of all, these ratings reflect mainly the knowledge and 
perception of institutional investors thus may not be representative of other potential 
important informants. Second, the coverage of these ratings is quite limited, and may 
not provide enough variation for our multivariate analysis. Last, corporate governance 
involves a set of complex relationships and rules, and includes several related yet 
different components. These ratings tend to average out the effects of different 
components and cannot afford us the opportunities of individually assessing the effects 
of different components on corruption.  
Corresponding to the two hypotheses regarding the corporate governance and 
corruption, we use two measures of corporate governance —one on the efficacy of 
corporate boards in representing outside shareholders (SHAREHOLDER) and the other 
on the quality of accounting practices (ACCOUNT)—both taken from Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR). GCR covers about 75 major economies around the 
world, and its ratings reflect the views of more than 4,600 business leaders and 
entrepreneurs from the countries surveyed.  
The first measure of corporate governance—the efficacy of corporate boards in 
representing outside shareholders—is based upon the question: “corporate boards in 
your country are (selected from 1 to 7 where 1=controlled by management and 
7=powerful and represent outside shareholders)?” While many studies on corporate 
governance have used measures such as ownership of firms, size of corporate board and 
composition of corporate boards to proxy for the quality of the corporate boards, the 
index provided by GCR has the distinct advantage of being able to directly measure the 
effectiveness of the corporate boards in representing shareholders.  
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The second measure of corporate governance focuses on the quality of 
accounting practices across countries. It is based on the question: “What amount of 
profits and wages does a company in your industry typically ‘keep off the books’ 
(selected from 1 to 10, where 1=less than 5%, 2=5-10%, 3=11-20%, 4=21-30%, …, 9=71-
80%, 10=more than 80%)?” Higher percentage of unreported profits and wages 
represents more frequent occurrence of accounting irregularities which imply that it 
might be relatively easy to hide the expenses of bribery.  Table 2 shows the GCR’s 
ratings on the two corporate governance indices for 2001-2002. 
Transparency International’s corruption index has been noted both for its 
internal consistency and for its consistency with other major corruption indices 
(Treisman). We choose the Transparency International’s corruption index for 2002 as the 
measure of corruption across countries. For the convenience of interpretation, we have 
adjusted the original index so that while the range of index is still from 0 to 10, a 10 
reflects the highest level of corruption and 0 the lowest.  
Besides the variables for corporate governance, several plausible determinants of 
corruption are included in our model as control variables. First of all, almost all major 
studies of the determinants of corruption have included GDP per capita as a 
determinant for corruption, and have reported a high level of correlation between high 
GDP per capita and low level of corruption. Felipe Larrain and Jose Tavares postulate 
that the demand for good governance is higher in rich countries than in poor countries, 
and that good institutions are more affordable in high-income countries as human 
capital capacity is unlikely to be a constraint. In this analysis, we use the logarithm of 
GDP per capita in 1999 to measure the difference in economic wealth across countries. 
Wu, X., 2005. Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis. Governance: 
An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 18 (2), 151-170. 
 
 18
The second economic variable included measures the openness of countries. 
Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella (1996 and 1999) find that countries that are more open 
to foreign trade tend to be less corrupt. Treisman further elaborates on the idea by 
pointing out that high level of imports reduces corruption by increasing the market 
competition and thus limiting the ability of the public officials to provide profitable 
protection to the potential bribe payers. In this paper, we use the share of imports in 
1999 divided by GDP to represent the openness across countries. 
We also include variables to account for the legal and cultural roots of corruption. 
The effectiveness of a country’s legal system may affect the risk of the corrupt officials 
being caught and punished. Treisman argues that countries with British colonial 
heritage inherited not only a common law but also a particular legal culture that 
emphasizes procedural justice. Religious traditions may also affect the level of 
corruption, and in particular, more egalitarian religions such as the Protestantism pose 
more challenge to authorities than more “hierarchical” religions. We include whether or 
not a country was once a British colony (BRITISH COLONY) and the percentage of 
population professing Protestant faith (PROTESTANT) to account for the legal and 
cultural factors determining the level of corruption. 
Last, the effects of the characteristics of the political institutions on corruption are 
also considered. Democratic norms and values de-legitimize corrupt practices, and a 
number of researchers (Treisman; Sandholtz and Koetzle) have found that countries that 
had been democracies for a long period time experience lower level of corruption. The 
distribution of power between central and local governments can also have an impacts 
on the level of corruption. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny argue that federalism 
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helps to curtail corruption practices by creating competition in the provision of public 
goods. In this paper, we use whether or not a country has been in democracy 
continuously since 1950 (DEMOCRACY) and whether or not a country is a federal state 
(FEDERAL) to capture the effects of political institutions on corruption.  
Table 3 presents the variable names, brief description and source of data.  A 
statistical summary of our data is shown in Table 4. 
 
Regression Results 
In order to test the two hypotheses regarding corporate governance and 
corruption, we analyze a set of multivariate models with Transparency International’s 
corruption index as dependent variable, and the results of OLS regression2 are shown in 
Table 5. Column (1) reports the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors when 
we include the two corporate governance variables as well as the full set of control 
variables discussed earlier. The regression coefficients indicate that the results from our 
data analysis are generally consistent with both the prediction of theories and the 
findings of other empirical studies. Economic wealth has a significant and negative 
coefficient, suggesting that a poor country plagued with a high level of corruption may 
grow its way out of corruption. The openness of the countries matters in the battle 
against corruption as indicated by the statistically significant coefficients on IMPORT: 
higher level of import has been found correlated with the lower level of corruption 
while controlling for other plausible determinants of corruption.  Both the high 
percentage of Protestants in the population and the British colonial heritage corresponds 
to a low level of corruption.  
 
2 We’ve used the White estimator to deal with potential issue of heteroskedastic error variance. 
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The findings also show that the two political institution variables, DEMOCRACY 
and FEDERAL, have the expected effects on the level of corruption: countries having 
been in democracy for a long time have lower level of corruption, and federal states are 
more corrupted than states that have more decentralized administrative structure. 
However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Such results are consistent 
when we add one variable at a time in Column (2) and (3) to account for the potential 
correlation between these two variables. In addition, there is virtually no change in the 
overall fitness of the model measured by R2 when we exclude these two variables as 
shown in Column (4), indicating that adding these control variables contributes little to 
the explanatory power of the model. Overall, our regression analysis suggests that the 
variables representing political institutions are weak predictors of the corruption given 
other determinants of corruption are accounted for.  
The results provide compelling evidence in favor of the two hypotheses that link 
corporate governance and corruption. Controlling for key determinants widely studied 
in the empirical studies on the causes of corruption, the coefficients on SHAREHOLDER 
and ACCOUNT have the expected effects on corruption and they are statistically 
significant. There will be less corruption in a country where the corporate boards truly 
represent the interests of shareholders; the prevention of accounting irregularity such as 
keeping profits and wage off the book can also play a positive role in the battle against 
corruption. 
The relative predictive power of the two corporate governance variables is also 
impressive. The last column, Column (5), shows the standardized coefficients of the 
variables when we only include the statistically significant variables (SHAREHOLDER, 
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ACCOUNT, GDP, IMPORT, PROTESTANT, and BRITISH COLONY) in the model. The 
most powerful predictor of in our model is income level (β=-0.506), followed by the level 
of accounting irregularity (β=0.263).  The relative explanatory weight of he efficacy of 
the corporate board in presenting the shareholders (β=0.15) is in the same range as 
Protestant values (β=-0.173). Overall, the standardized coefficients show that the 
corporate governance indicators are powerful predictors of the level of corruption.   
To test the robustness of our results regarding the effects of the corporate 
governance indicators to corruption, we also use Transnational International’s Bribe 
Payers Index 2002 as dependent variable3 to run a regression analysis. Bribe Payers 
Index ranks 21 leading exporting countries in terms of the degree to which their 
corporations are perceived to be paying bribes abroad. Since the Bribe Payers Index 
focuses on the behaviors of the firms only, variables account for the demand side of the 
corruption are dropped out of the model. Table 6 shows that the two corporate 
governance measures have the expected effects on the perceived level of corrupt 
practices of the firms from nations ranked in the Bribe Payers Index. Firms from 
countries with lower corporate governance standards are more likely to export corrupt 
practices to other nations.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The recent surge of interests in corporate governance from institutional investors, 
international organizations and governments around the world should be a welcome 
news for the global anti-corruption campaign. Our empirical results support a 
 
3 To be consistent with results reported earlier, we have adjusted the original index so that while the range of index is still 
from 0 to 10, a 10 reflects the highest level of bribery and 0 the lowest. 
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theoretical projection that good corporate governance can lead to reduced level of 
corruption. More emphasis should be directed to the bribe payers instead of focusing 
sorely on the bribe takers.  
While studies focusing on the demand side of corruption have provided a rather 
pessimistic outlook of the global anti-corruption campaign (Treisman), our analysis 
based on both the demand and supply sides of corruption offers reasons for optimism. It 
is in the interest of the firms to improve corporate governance, and such improvement 
will not only impose more constraints on the firms’ decisions to bribe but also expose 
corrupt officials to higher risks of being caught. 
Corporate governance can well become a critical ingredient to break a vicious 
cycle of bribery and corruption. This vicious cycle starts when firms are forced into 
bribery practices because of a high level of corruption, but widened participation of 
firms in bribery practices further feeds into the perception of high corruption, which in 
turn makes the bribery practices even more uncontrollable. Our analysis of the linkage 
between corporate governance and corruption suggests that the improvement in 
corporate governance may be a catalyst to break the vicious cycle of bribery and 
corruption.   
Shareholders and investors in countries that are experiencing a high level of 
corruption may receive double dividends from the improvement in corporate 
government. Companies with better corporate governance have better prospects of 
growth and command higher valuation in the market. The McKinsey study we 
mentioned earlier shows that global investors are willing to pay more for better 
governed companies. At the same time, better corporate governance also helps to reduce 
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the bribery practices at the firm level, which potentially can further increase the 
valuation of the firms.  
At the country level, improvement in corporate governance may help a country 
with a high level of corruption to partially offset the negative impacts of the perception 
of corruption on the flow of capital (both financial and human capital), and the 
additional capital induced by good corporate government serves as catalyst for further 
improvement in both corporate governance and the governance of the public sector. 
On the other hand, however, bad corporate governance may also undermine the 
effectiveness of the global anti-corruption campaign in an era of globalization. We find 
that firms from countries with lower corporate governance standards are more likely to 
be involved in bribery practices when they export goods or services to other nations.  
Therefore, improving corporate governance in some leading exporting nations should be 
a top priority in the global anti-corruption campaign.  
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Table 1  Corporate Governance Ratings 
Country PWC Rating McKinsey Rating ClSA Rating
Argentina 49 24 5
Brazil 63 24 4
Canada 11         
Chile 28 18 6
China 86 25 3
Colombia 55 21 4
Czech Republic 77 2
Ecuador 68         
Egypt 68 39         
France 13         
Germany 13         
Greece 49 4
Guatemala 71         
Hong Kong 53 6
Hungary 65 4
India 79 23 5
Indonesia 68 25 3
Israel 62         
Italy 26 16         
Japan 81 21         
Kenya 72         
Lithuania 59         
Malaysia 22 3
Mexico 29 19 6




Poland 55 23 3
Romania 78         
Russia 81 38 2
Singapore 38 21 7
South Africa 82 22 5
South Korea 90 20 3
Spain 14         
Sweden 13         
Switzerland 15         
Taiwan 56 19 5
Thailand 78 20 3
Turkey 80 27 4
United Kingdom 45 12         
United States 25 14         
Uruguay 56         
Venezuela 50 24         
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Albania 7.5 Latvia 6.3 3.8 2.6
Angola 8.3 Lithuania 5.2 3.8 2.2
Argentina 7.2 4.0 2.4 Luxembourg 1.0 . .
Australia 1.4 5.5 1.3 Madagascar 8.3 . .
Austria 2.2 4.8 1.4 Malawi 7.1 . .
Azerbaijan 8.0 Malaysia 5.1 3.7 1.7
Bangladesh 8.8 2.2 3.8 Mauritius 5.5 2.6 1.9
Belarus 5.2 Mexico 6.4 3.5 2.0
Belgium 2.9 4.8 1.0 Moldova 7.9
Bolivia 7.8 3.3 3.0 Morocco 6.3
Botswana 3.6 Namibia 4.3
Brazil 6.0 3.5 2.6 Netherlands 1.0 5.0 1.4
Bulgaria 6.0 3.3 2.6 New Zealand 0.5 5.3 1.2
Cameroon 7.8 Nicaragua 7.5 3.5 2.3
Canada 1.0 5.2 1.4 Nigeria 8.4 4.2 3.4
Chile 2.5 4.5 1.4 Norway 1.5 5.5 1.1
China 6.5 3.3 2.4 Pakistan 7.4
Colombia 6.4 4.2 2.0 Panama 7.0 4.0 2.5
Costa Rica 5.5 4.6 2.6 Paraguay 8.3 3.5 2.7
Cote d'Ivoire 7.3 Peru 6.0 3.8 2.3
Croatia 6.2 Philippines 7.4 3.8 3.0
Czech Republic 6.3 3.2 2.6 Poland 6.0 4.7 2.4
Denmark 0.5 5.2 1.1 Portugal 3.7 3.6 2.6
Dominican Republic 6.5 3.7 2.6 Romania 7.4 5.1 4.2
Ecuador 7.8 3.5 3.2 Russia 7.3 3.9 3.2
Egypt 6.6 3.7 2.2 Senegal 6.9
El Salvador 6.6 3.5 2.0 Singapore 0.7 4.8 1.2
Estonia 4.4 4.8 2.6 Slovak Republic 6.3 3.8 3.2
Ethiopia 6.5 Slovenia 4.0 4.0 2.6
Finland 0.3 5.9 1.0 South Africa 5.2 5.1 1.6
France 3.7 4.9 1.2 South Korea 5.5 3.5 2.0
Georgia 7.6 Spain 2.9 5.0 1.3
Germany 2.7 5.2 1.5 Sri Lanka 6.3 3.5 2.5
Ghana 6.1 Sweden 0.7 5.6 1.2
Greece 5.8 3.1 2.5 Switzerland 1.5 5.3 1.3
Guatemala 7.5 3.3 2.7 Taiwan 4.4 4.8 1.6
Haiti 7.8 Tanzania 7.3
Honduras 7.3 2.5 2.5 Thailand 6.8 3.9 2.7
Hong Kong 1.8 3.9 1.4 Trinidad and Tobago 5.1 3.8 2.1
Hungary 5.1 4.7 2.2 Tunisia 5.2
Iceland 0.6 4.8 1.2 Turkey 6.8 2.8 3.4
India 7.3 3.5 2.0 Uganda 7.9
Indonesia 8.1 3.3 2.1 Ukraine 7.6 4.3 4.2
Ireland 3.1 4.6 1.3 United Kingdom 1.3 5.5 1.4
Israel 2.7 4.7 1.6 United States 2.3 5.7 1.2
Italy 4.8 4.4 1.9 Uruguay 4.9 3.8 2.5
Jamaica 6.0 4.5 2.5 Uzbekistan 7.1
Japan 2.9 2.9 1.1 Venezuela 7.5 3.3 2.0
Jordan 5.5 3.8 2.5 Vietnam 7.6 4.1 2.7
Kazakhstan 7.7 Zambia 7.4
Kenya 8.1 Zimbabwe 7.3 4.1 1.6
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Observations Mean Std. Dev 
SHAREHOLDER 72 4.14 0.85 
ACCOUNT 72 2.14 0.77 
GDP 72 9.06 0.89 
IMPORT 72 41.26 24.50 
PROTESTANT 72 15.25 25.60 
BRITISH COLONY 72 0.29 0.46 
FEDERAL 72 0.22 0.42 
DEMOCRACY 72 0.28 0.45 
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Table 5   Regression Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SHAREHOLDER -0.416** -0.391* -0.479** -0.438** -0.150 
  (0.201) (0.197) (0.174) (0.166)   
ACCOUNT 0.844*** 0.821*** 0.869*** 0.841*** 0.263 
  (0.231) (0.232) (0.217) (0.213)   
GDP -1.370*** -1.377*** -1.418*** -1.410*** -0.506 
  (0.202) (0.199) (0.206) (0.203)   
IMPORT -0.009* -0.010* -0.008* -0.009** -0.087 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)   
PROTESTANT -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.173 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)   
BRITISH 
COLONY -0.488* -0.469* -0.529** -0.500* -0.093 
  (0.253) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256)   
DEMOCRACY -0.336 -0.224       
  (0.403) (0.387)       
FEDERAL 0.394   0.336     
  (0.276)   (0.264)     
CONSTANT 18.066*** 18.202*** 18.595*** 18.558   
  (1.929) (1.926) (2.003) (2.001)   
            
Number of Obs. 72 72 72 72   




The table reports unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses 
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 Table 6  Model Using Bribe Payers Index 2002 as Dependent Variable 
 
  Coefficient 
SHAREHOLDER -1.119*** 
  (0.310) 
ACCOUNT 1.480*** 
  (0.351) 
CONSTANT 6.959*** 





The table reports unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
